Discourses of Danger
Locating Emma Goldman
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Government, media, and medical accounts of Emma Goldman converged to create her public presence in the U.S. as a “dangerous individual.” The prevailing discourses constituted Goldman as violent, utilizing her alleged menace to distract attention from far more egregious violence against labor by state and corporate forces. Goldman responded by denouncing, confronting, and redirecting the alarmed gaze toward greater risks left underarticulated in hegemonic accounts. Goldman’s bold confrontations with authorities constituted a kind of anarchist parrhesia, fearless speech, a relentless truth-telling practice that risked her own security in pursuit of her “beautiful ideal.” The labor of remembering America’s history of class violence hones our attention to the complex discursive processes by which some historical facts come to count in prevailing narratives, while others fade into obscurity.

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Overseeing the deportation of Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and 247 other radicals in 1919, J. Edgar Hoover pronounced Goldman and Berkman “two of the most dangerous anarchists in America.” He was not alone: Goldman was persistently framed as a “dangerous individual” during her lifetime, and current engagements with Goldman often continue that line of inquiry. Yet the utility and implications of this interpretive touchstone are not self-evident: interrogating the politics and history of this frame both helps us understand the process by which radical political critique can be collapsed into the alleged traits of an individual personality and also enables us to see how other dangers—structural, systemic dangers—become unintelligible within that frame.

In order to illuminate these processes of collapse and erasure, I first inventory some elements of the discursive network articulating Goldman’s

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public presence in the U.S. during her lifetime; second, I look at Goldman’s response, seeing her “fearless speech” as challenging the predominant political logic in some ways while being contained by it in others; third, I move inside the discourses of danger, inviting readers to assess those fears; and lastly, I encourage us to set aside the question of whether Goldman was dangerous in order to ask how other violence, far more murderous state and corporate violence, has been rendered less visible by the prevailing frame. The dominant grammars of intelligibility make some aspects of Goldman’s politics hypervisible, while throwing others into shadow. By problematizing the danger-laden context for apprehending Goldman, making it strange and thus in need of explanation, I find a path to account for and contest the neglect of violence against labor in U.S. historical awareness.

Investigating public constructions of danger and the curtailment of radical political critique in the late 19th and early 20th centuries resonates in the early 21st century as well. Within the context of heightened official security, Americans are regularly characterized as endangered by irrational, unaccountably violent Others. Now, as then, authorities construct and deploy figures of danger they then claim merely to have discovered; now, as then, possibilities of radical critique are curtailed by acute over-reading of individuals’ intentions and personas; now, as then, prevailing discursive regimes make hegemonic ways of thinking seem obvious while more critical perspectives remain underarticulated. Analyzing the productive work done by discourse networks, and the struggles within those networks to contest or sustain state and corporate power, suggests theoretical tools for loosening the hold of power on meaning and making greater space for fresh critical insights.

**Discourse Networks**

Several discourse-generating networks converged to articulate Goldman as a “dangerous individual”: an intensified legal and police apparatus; an expanding national and international press network; and an array of medical and psychiatric technologies identifying potential abnormalities and their attendant deficiencies of character and citizenship. Discourse networks are made up of “linkages of power, technologies, signifying marks, and bodies.”7 These networks invited people into a hermeneutic of danger rendering Goldman monstrous (or, sometimes, not monstrous) and society, imperiled. Discourse networks are best understood as layered sites of struggle, where hegemonic understandings are produced, contested, and reproduced. While the prevailing practices of intelligibility are pervasive,
connecting overlapping audiences, they are also contradictory and incomplete, offering opportunities to contest or evade dominant meanings. The expanded reach of law enforcement and judicial investigation enabled, as Foucault noted, “a new mapping and closer surveillance of urban space,” producing enhanced information about radical political movements and rendering them in terms indistinguishable from criminality.3 Reporters and editors entertained readers and sold newspapers by engaging the potentially salacious zone of indiscernability among politics, sex, and crime. Medical experts mined the external appearance of individuals to explain and predict their “dangerous tendencies.” The historically specific machineries organizing information about what counted as danger and who was rendered unsafe worked overtime on Goldman, singling her out for a discursive spotlight that few other radicals, certainly no other immigrant radicals, achieved.

Allies of Goldman’s from the progressive movement and associated liberal causes sometimes contested this ominous characterization and defended her controversial public speech by appeal to constitutionally guaranteed individual freedoms. Yet these defenders were unsuccessful, in the end, in folding Goldman into the prevailing national terms of discourse; fidelity to freedom of speech, press, and assembly was trumped by the exaggerated urgencies of national security. Especially after the assassination of President McKinley, Goldman’s “demonic legend” took root as Red Emma, the “enemy of God, law, marriage, the State.”4 Within anarchist circles, Goldman was controversial for other reasons as well: her break with mentor Johann Most over Berkman’s attempted assassination of Henry Clay Frick, in retribution for the murders of striking workers at Homestead, Pennsylvania, marked “a permanent rift in the U.S. anarchist movement.”5 Other anti-state voices, including those of individualist, libertarian anarchists such as Benjamin Tucker, differed with Goldman over her vehement opposition to capitalism.6 More sympathetic views on Goldman sometimes made their way into mainstream assessments, especially in the later years; Eleanor Roosevelt, for example, liked her autobiography and probably contributed to the legal process through which Goldman returned to the U.S. for a 90 day speaking tour in 1934.7 Yet the Emma Goldman who could be known outside the circles of anarchist counterpublics, especially during her active years in the U.S. from 1885-1919, was largely a product of the dominant intersecting systems of criminal, medical, and media technologies; her presence in public life was construed primarily within the discourses of danger they generated.8

Goldman responded to the charges of danger by denying, confronting, and redirecting the alarmed gaze toward greater risks left underarticulated
in hegemonic accounts. The dominant gazes on Goldman scrutinized her for signs of the peril they already knew she posed to their rule, while she reversed their gaze and located danger within the claims of sovereignty and the ruling practices of economy, interpretation, and law. Goldman’s bold confrontations with authorities constituted a kind of anarchist parrhesia, fearless speech, a relentless truth-telling practice that risked her own security in pursuit of her “beautiful ideal.” Foucault identifies parrhesia as “a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself).” While frank and courageous criticism of authorities, guided by fierce political and ethical commitment to anarchism, was Goldman’s stock-in-trade, her strategic parrhesia combined frontal assault with carefully calculated rhetorical arts and tactical silences. By examining Goldman’s responses, I take seriously the question “was she dangerous?” yet in the end I move past that query to ask why so many people spent so much time asking that question, and with what consequences.

Analyzing discourse networks requires attention to the preconditions for making and circulating meaning. To map such networks is to trace fluid webs of power, marking their sites of concentration, their practices of exchange, their interruptions and interventions, as well as the possibilities of resistance they both enable and corrode. Discourse networks do not determine people’s ideas and actions, but they do shape the context, articulating or withholding needed opportunities for making meaning and communicating intelligible ideas. From “the noisy reservoir of all possible written constellations, paths, and media of transmission, or mechanisms of memory,” the agents of law enforcement, medicine, and media consistently selected those that organized her meaning around the central spindle of danger. How did discourses of danger achieve such vigorous circulation? What other questions failed to reach the needed threshold of articulation?

Law and order: When J. Edgar Hoover was overseeing Goldman’s deportation, he insisted on the “undue harm” Goldman and Berkman would inflict on American society. As head of the newly established General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice, Hoover had been recruited by Woodrow Wilson’s new attorney general, A. Mitchell Palmer, to be his special assistant. Together they utilized the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 to launch an assault on radical individuals and organizations, arresting many thousands of people during the largely illegal crackdowns that became known as the Palmer Raids. The Draft Act and the Espionage Act criminalized opposition to military recruitment, the charge on which Goldman and Berkman were
convicted in 1917, while the Sedition Act made it a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the U.S. government. Anarchism became the first and only ideology to serve as grounds for exclusion from the United States. This body of law seamlessly joined ideology with accusation, criminalizing the idea of overthrowing the government by unlawful means. The Comstock Laws, begun in 1873 and continuing well into the 1930s, also contributed to the criminalization of anarchism by defining “obscenity” so broadly that it included birth control, sexuality, erotic literature, and radical ideas in general. The ideology of anarchy became a crime, a crime that is an idea, an idea that is a crime.

While Hoover was obsessed with Goldman’s case and had her bail set prohibitively high ($15,000), he had plenty of company. In an internal government memo in 1917, Francis Caffey, U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, wrote, “Emma Goldman is a woman of great ability and of personal magnetism, and her persuasive powers are such to make her an exceedingly dangerous woman.” Government agents eager to prove that she advocated violence, encouraged the poor to steal from the rich, or peddled “obscenity” tailed her and reported to various authorities. Two decades earlier, on October 17, 1893, New York Judge Martine sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment for “unlawful assembly,” saying “I look upon you as a dangerous woman in your doctrine.” At different times, the governments of France, Britain, Germany, the U.S., and the former Soviet Union watched and reported on Emma Goldman. In fact, international police cooperation was largely an artifact of efforts “to control the international spread of people and organizations that were held to be opponents of established political systems, such as socialists, democrats, liberals, and anarchists.” Although global cooperation in anti-anarchist efforts was hampered by national rivalries, international conferences in Rome and St. Petersburg facilitated direct communications among police and intelligence-gathering agencies in Europe, Russia, and the U.S. for purposes of tracking the “wild beasts without nationality” who posed a threat “to all persons.” The French government concluded that Goldman’s presence would “compromise public security” and issued an extradition order enjoining her to exit France in 1901. A report from the German government called her “an exceedingly dangerous person.” While some of these communications were for internal eyes only, others were pronounced in courtrooms, circulated through chains of command, and publicized in interviews, contributing to a critical mass of official words about society’s vulnerability to the threat of Emma Goldman.

At the same time, despite national and international coordination of governments’ anti-anarchist efforts, the apparatus of surveillance and enforcement in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries was uneven and its effectiveness, inconsistent. There was a certain “wild west” air in U.S. law enforcement, allowing Goldman and others to evade or contest the suppression of written and spoken words.22 Specific locales might have more sympathetic authorities or enthusiastic audiences, giving Goldman a temporary advantage in her game of cat-and-mouse with the police, courts, and prisons, but in the end government authorities stripped her of her citizenship and, utilizing the 1918 Immigration Act, sent her into exile.

_Media._ Reporters enthusiastically joined the jeopardy chorus. The _New York World_ followed her to “Anarchy’s Den” where she “rules with a Nod the Savage Reds.”23 The Spokane _Spokesman-Review_ reported that the “woman terrorist” frightened her listeners who cast “fearful glances” when she “let drop some telltale word that revealed her true significance.”24 In contrast, William Marion Reedy’s sympathetic interview in the _St. Louis Mirror_ in 1908 objected that “she is simple and not violent” and dangerous only to slavery, pretense, and greed.25 _The New York Times_ in 1909 ridiculed “the average newspaper reader” who saw Goldman as “a wild-eyed inciter of violence” and claimed instead that she was “a well-read, intellectual woman with a theory of society not very different from that entertained by a lot of college professors who can talk without danger of police interference.”26 These two kinds of press reports are the opposite ends of the same conceptual ground. The alternative to labeling her as dangerous was to protest that she was not dangerous, a denial that confirmed the relevance of the category.

The only other dimension of Goldman’s presence so consistently evoked by reporters was, predictably, her appearance. Public expectations of large, masculinized, uncontrolled females, tastelessly attired, merged with anti-Semitic presumptions about “dirty Jews” and nativist prejudices against “unwashed foreigners.” Over and over, reporters were surprised that she was not hideous, and took care to reassure readers that she was small (4 feet, 10 1/2 inches, according to her Philadelphia police report), attractive, intelligent, well-dressed, soft-spoken, earnest.27 Several noted that she was clean. One commented on her small feet, noting that they remained primly on the floor during the interview. Other news accounts, particularly those after 1901, portrayed Goldman literally as the devil herself, surrounded by the flames of hell.28 Anticipating the theme of sin and danger, an 1892 account in the _New York World_ informed the public that she had an ugly smile, “her lips wreathed into lines” like “the mouths of some snakes.”29

The press’s gaze on Goldman looked for danger in her body and her self-presentation. Whether journalists and editors accepted or rejected the charge
that Goldman was dangerous, they all accepted the question “is she dangerous?” as the relevant question to ask. A few of the better interviews, such as those with Nelly Bly in the New York World in 1893 and Miriam Michelson in the Philadelphia North American in 1901, also considered her ideas, looking for danger there as well. The American public became increasingly engaged with Goldman as she gained celebrity status, as the press “hooked the public on daily news of her whereabouts.”

Her volumes of hate mail peaked around the assassination of McKinley in 1901 by anarchist Leon Czolgosz as well as other times in which national attention was drawn to her as the best known anarchist in the U.S. After McKinley’s assassination, Falk explains, “The newspapers’ portrayal of the assassin as an immigrant anarchist incited by Emma Goldman’s radical ideas unleashed a public thirst for revenge against these ‘dangerous’ outsiders. Overnight, the press transformed Goldman, a slight woman in her thirties, who was developing a following as an intelligent critic of law-and-order politics and an eloquent spokesperson for anarchist ideas, into a she-devil who had inspired an act of terror.” Yet this seemingly rapid transformation of Goldman’s persona was set in the context of a much longer process of anarchism’s demonization; the post-McKinley red scare was a particularly lethal move in the ongoing “othering” of the agents of radical critique. In his study of representations of the “anarchist beast” in U.S. magazines prior to the 1903 tightening of anti-anarchist laws, Nathaniel Hong found anarchists widely represented as “antithetical to the best instincts of humanity, as morally adrift, intellectually illogical, religiously unacceptable, medically anomalous, and dangerously unpatriotic.” Anarchists were thus already available to be found dangerous and thrown out of acceptable society, becoming the needed outside against which others could claim to be on the inside of proper order.

Science and medicine. Medical authorities played a small but notable role in the construal of Goldman as a dangerous individual. A phrenological exam of the shape and size of her skull, along with that of fellow anarchist Marie Louise, was performed by experts from the Phrenological Journal and Science of Health after her 1893 conviction for inciting unemployed workers to “take bread.” The scientific study of the skull to establish individual and racial personality types was enormously popular in the U.S.; while in retrospect we can see it was a racist pseudo-science, phrenology was also an energetic center for several reform movements, including temperance, suffrage, women’s dress reform, vegetarianism, hypnotism, and hydrotherapy. The Phrenological Journal and Science of Health lasted over 70 years, making it the “longest-lived phrenological magazine
in the country.”35 From a relatively small base of 1,500 paid subscribers in 1838, it expanded rapidly to 20,000 subscribers by 1848 and more than 50,000 by the mid-1850s.36 While phrenology’s popularity was waning by the end of the 19th century, it still maintained a foothold in the criminal-producing discourses and the popular culture of Goldman’s time. According to Madeline Stern’s history of the phrenology movement, the Journal “had a surprisingly respectable reputation among the cognoscenti of the day.”37 Its chief attraction was its phrenological reports on presidents, artists, writers, political activists, and others in the public eye. Part science, part entrepreneurship, part social crusade, part show business, the Journal engaged a wide variety of issues through the lens of “the new science of the mind that promised to liberate humanity.”38

While earlier in the century anarchists Stephen Pearl Andrews and Josiah Warren had received sympathetic treatment in the Journal and the movement, by the 1890s phrenology’s relation to anarchism had cooled.39 The Journal’s account of Goldman contributed to the dispersed, incremental process by which alarming images of her were created and circulated. The editor assured readers that “however dangerous they may be in person and at short range,” the two women could not harm the readers from “the shadows we print.”40 In the interests of fairness, the author acknowledged that, “both these women, especially Marie Louise, repudiate the commonly accepted idea that they advocate violence as a means of reform,” then nonetheless went on to read his subjects as fundamentally alarming.41 The Journal opined that Goldman did not look Jewish, but that her appearance indicated “an ineradicable instinct to hold an opinion.”42 Among her “pathological stigmata,”43 the writer named the length of the back of her head, revealing “friendship, domestic attachment and love of the opposite sex”; the width just over her ears, revealing “destructiveness and appetite for food”; the rear of the crown, indicating a “habit of willfulness”; and the overall “signs of quality and temperament which account for the woman’s disposition to attack the present social fabric.”44 The writer paused to admire her “beautifully developed” upper forehead, showing a “familiarity with the vocabulary of philosophy which is ordinarily expected only among cultivated professional men,” before plunging back into the peril indicated by her eyebrows, which revealed “scarcely a trace of order” and “little fondness for words or fluency in speech.”45 The article concluded with some professional jostling between phrenologists and their competitors the cheirognomists, who read character from examining the hands. Evidently the two subdisciplines of early eugenics disagreed on their reading of the signs of willfulness and logic marked on Goldman’s body, yet they fully concurred that relevant stigmata were present and offered themselves to be read.
Discourses of danger converged to crystallize their representations of Goldman and her fellow anarchists around a tried and true set of referents virtually guaranteed to provoke revulsion and fear. Tracing the constitution of the “dangerous individual” in Goldman’s time, Foucault finds medical, psychiatric, and juridical institutions combined to issue a “perpetual act of summoning” individuals considered “intrinsically dangerous.”46 “Little by little, an image was built up of an enemy of society who can equally well be a revolutionary or a murderer—since, after all, revolutionaries do sometimes kill.”47 This perpetual act of summoning Goldman as dangerous shapes the Goldman that we can readily retrieve while undermining the force of her political critique. As David Campbell has pointed out, “the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience.”48 Dangerous individuals and parrhesia are logical mirrors of one another, linked positions within discursive networks of power and resistance. Goldman was considered dangerous by authorities because of her fearless speech; her political critique was, in the end, intolerable because she had so consistently been identified as a dangerous individual. After considering Goldman’s response to the semiotics of jeopardy, I want to rearticulate some of the pivotal events and constitutive relations that were invoked by authorities to establish the anarchist peril. Since, as Campbell insists, “representations are taxed when they confront new and ambiguous circumstances,” reframing selected historical materials from anarchist and labor struggles offers the chance to rethink the aura of menace around Emma Goldman.49

Goldman’s Response

Goldman responded on several levels to her persistent discursive location as dangerous: first, she engaged the charge in order to deny it; second, she insisted that political violence was an understandable response to oppression; and third, she reversed the gaze, redirecting the discourse of danger.50 The stakes were high: her ability to keep herself and her comrades out of jail, and her publications out of the hands of the censors, while maintaining her connections with anarchism’s insurgent factions as well as with the array of liberal and radical supporters who eschewed armed resistance, required complex negotiations around questions of political violence.51

The period from 1878 to 1932 has been characterized by historian Mike Davis as “the ‘classical age’ of terrorism: the half-century during which the bourgeois imaginary was haunted by the infamous figure of the bomb-throwing nihilist or anarchist.”52 From the assassination of Tsar Alexander II
of Russia by Narodnaya Volya in 1881 to the unsuccessful effort by Italian anarchists to assassinate Mussolini in 1932, a series of attentats against political leaders and class enemies rocked the political establishments of the industrializing nations and infused prevailing public discourse with the language of danger. An attentat is an assassination intended to eliminate an oppressor of the people, demonstrate the vulnerability of the elite, and rouse the masses to revolt. Also called “propaganda of the deed,” attentats were often acts of revenge for prior assaults on protestors or last desperate acts of defiance “in the wake of defeated hopes for popular uprisings.”\(^{53}\) Attentaters often planned to use their own arrest and trial as a platform from which to explain their act to the multitude and galvanize revolutionary sentiment; they accepted their own imprisonment or execution as heroic acts of martyrdom.

Political assassination was relatively common in the turbulent setting of late 19th–early 20th century Russia; the Russian anarchists characterized their relentless campaign against the state as “smert za smert,” “death for death,” a strategy parodied by Trotsky as the murder of state functionaries, “Ivan after Ivan.”\(^{54}\) The strategy was much less frequent in Europe and “largely hypothetical” in the U.S.\(^{55}\) Goldman was among the small number of European immigrants who tried to import the technique to America, with spectacularly unsuccessful results. In 1892 Goldman, Berkman, and two other young anarchists attempted an attentat against Henry Clay Frick, the man responsible for the violence against striking workers at the Carnegie steel mills in Homestead, Pennsylvania.\(^{56}\) Not only did Frick live, but the trial was a travesty of stymied communication and the American working class showed little receptivity toward the act.

Denial. Goldman’s refutations took the form of argument plus ridicule, a typical Goldman combination. She parodied official alarm to highlight the authorities’ fear of critical ideas. “I have come back to you after having served ten months in prison for talking,” she said to her welcoming committee after her first stint in prison for encouraging unemployed workers to “take bread.” Lampooning the authorities’ fear of words, she joked that “they will never stop women from talking.”\(^{57}\) The authorities, she insisted, were simply paranoid. The \textit{New York Sun} attributed this comment to Goldman: “‘It’s all too absurdly silly,’ she said, with a quiet little laugh, ‘this talk about my being dangerous.’”\(^{58}\) Goldman took official persecution and harassment—including numerous arrests; confiscation of correspondence, mailing lists, and publications; suppression of lectures and meetings; at least one beating; and three jail terms—as evidence that “Nothing is more dangerous than the truth.”\(^{59}\) The authorities,
she argued, feared that she would “open the eyes of the oppressed and show them a way to a better condition.” In her address to the jury at her 1917 trial for conspiring to oppose the draft, she derided the dramatic entrance of the U.S. marshal into Mother Earth’s offices, where the police discovered “the two dangerous disturbers and trouble-makers, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, in their separate offices, quietly at work at their desks, wielding not a sword, nor a gun or a bomb, but merely their pens!”

Explanation. Well aware that any word other than condemnation would provoke retribution, Goldman nonetheless sought to understand and explain the attentators’ acts by articulating what Mike Davis calls “the moral architecture of their universe.” In “The Psychology of Political Violence,” published in Anarchism and Other Essays in 1910, Goldman insisted on sympathetic understanding of political assassins. She quoted literary and psychological authorities, as well as the court speeches of several attentators, to support her argument that “it is their supersensitiveness to the wrong and injustice surrounding them which compels them to pay the toll of our social crimes.” “Goaded and desperate individuals” turn to assassination as “violent recoil from violence.” Ideologies do not make people into killers of the powerful, she insisted; an acute inability to tolerate human suffering does. Anarchism may act as a “leaven for rebellion” by advocating for the conscious political agency of individuals and by blaming structures of power, rather than inexorable fate, for injustice, but the turn toward violence is the last desperate act of sensitive souls unable to reconcile themselves to misery. Even in Berkman’s case, she insisted, “not Anarchism, as such, but the brutal slaughter of the eleven steel workers [at Homestead] was the urge” for his act.

In “An Open Letter” in Free Society on February 17, 1901, soon after the assassination of McKinley, she stated her position on the attentat: “I am on the side of every rebel, whether his act has been beneficial or detrimental to our cause; for I do not judge an act by its result, but by its cause.” Goldman insisted on finding the capacity to resist in every person, while the extraordinary few can neither find solace elsewhere nor reconcile themselves to the slow pace of change. In her address to the jury at her final trial for opposing conscription, when she might have avoided the subject, she instead declared, “It is organized violence at the top which creates individual violence at the bottom. It is the accumulated indignation against organized wrong, organized crime, organized injustice which drives the political offender to his act. To condemn him means to be blind to the causes which make him.” Those who profess their opposition to injustice yet take no
action against it have more to answer for, in Goldman’s ethical universe, than do the attentaters.

Reversal. Beyond explaining the dynamics of political violence, she also reversed its terms, disputing its constructions of sites of danger and refo-cusing attention onto the state, capitalism, and empire as origin points for far vaster dangers than Goldman and her fellow anarchists could possibly pose. “Compared with the wholesale violence of capital and government, political acts of violence are but a drop in the ocean.”69 Reversing the terms allowed Goldman to contest the legitimacy of state and corporate violence while claiming some ethical footing for virtuous assassins.

One way that she accomplished this reversal was to make available the words of those who killed for the people. Goldman quoted extensively in “The Psychology of Political Violence” from the final court room speeches of Vaillant, who threw a bomb into the Paris Chamber of Deputies, and Caserio, who killed the president of France to protest Vaillant's execution, to share not only their emotional state of mind but also their critique of capitalism and the state. Addressing the court, Vaillant said, “I know very well that I shall be told that I ought to have confined myself to speech for the vindication of the people’s claims. But what can you expect! It takes a loud voice to make the deaf hear. Too long have they answered our voices by imprisonment, the rope, rifle volleys.”70 Caserio, condemning the wretched living conditions of the many compared with the privileges of the few, concluded his speech with this warning: “Gentlemen of the Jury, you are representatives of bourgeois society. If you want my head, take it; but do not believe that in so doing you will stop the Anarchist propaganda. Take care, for men reap what they have sown.”71 It is likely that American readers would find these speeches reproduced only in publications by Goldman or other anarchists, where they are treated as reasonable political analyses rather than the rantings of madmen.

Another strategy of reversal entailed traveling to sites of state or capitalist violence against labor in order to give voice to strikers’ issues. Goldman called attention to the vulnerability of workers and the ready availability of militia, private security firms, and vigilantes to quell strikes. This strategy worked on two levels: first, Goldman gave voice to labor’s demands, and reported on workers’ resistance and the violence with which it was met, putting this information into circulation via her cross-country lectures, books, monthly journal Mother Earth, and multitudinous letters. Workplace organizing and subsequent violence against strikers and their families were not well reported in the mainstream press, while the ever-elastic definition of “obscenity” under the
Comstock laws barred many radical publications from the mails. She built solidarity and articulated workers’ grievances to themselves and the larger public.72

Second, because it was Goldman speaking, the press more often paid attention. Goldman was the “advance woman” for the anarchist movement: she had contacts in respectable liberal circles that few other immigrant radicals could claim; she had celebrity status, so whatever she did was news; she was an effective fundraiser; and she could gain, if not a fair hearing, at least a degree of publicity for workers’ struggles. The militant politics of radical labor and of anarchism were mutually constitutive: Goldman spoke to standing-room-only crowds on the merits of direct action, for example, while the Wobblies were filling the jails and jamming the courts during their free speech fights.73 While her comrade Alexander Berkman worked more steadily with grassroots labor organizing, Goldman was the better spokesperson for radical labor to the larger American public.

Was She Dangerous?

Many commentators on Goldman since her reemergence as feminist icon in the 1970s have celebrated her commitment to a radical vision of human freedom, not her participation in revolutionary violence. In her documentary guide, Candice Falk observed that “Goldman’s lasting influence is evidenced most clearly in the specific realms of freedom she espoused—in free speech, in sexual freedom—more than from the general promotion of anarchism that propelled her intellectual and political work.”74 Alix Kates Shulman, for example, praised Goldman because, “she dared to attack every authority that tried to put fences around the human spirit” and encouraged her own generation of radicals to take up Goldman’s struggle.75 Falk’s early curriculum guide for middle and high school classes stresses Goldman’s views on immigration, freedom of expression, women’s rights, anti-militarism, and social change through art and literature.76 Many commentators take Goldman at her word in her autobiography, where Goldman stressed that she turned away from violence after the disastrous attentat against Frick. For example, Leslie Howe states that after Goldman’s “willing, if somewhat inept” participation in the attentat against Frick, “she eventually became more convinced of the value of Kropotkin’s limited pacifism.”77 In these writings, it was Goldman’s ideas that were dangerous: her ideal of a just and beautiful society inspired struggles for social change, and her uncompromising presence in public life exposed the hypocrisies of allegedly democratic governance. She had a unique ability to
generate coalitions among liberal and radical groups, and among immigrants and native born citizens, by articulating their common struggles for freedom of speech (including freedom to organize the workplace), right to a fair trial, availability of birth control, right to travel, and an overall spirit of individual freedom. Looking back at Goldman's time from within this gaze, the authorities look extreme, if not paranoid and even ridiculous, for their fervent efforts to silence her rather than simply accept her words as a protected form of speech in American society.

In volume 2 of their documentary history of Goldman's work during her time in the U.S. (1885-1919), Falk, Pateman, and Moran contest this iconic history. They emphasize Goldman's likely involvement in the less innocent side of international anarchism: she ran guns to and laundered money for the militant Social Revolutionaries during the early years of the Russian revolution; she helped raise money for Berkman's attempted prison breaks; she and her comrade Max Baginski advocated a strategy of political violence against "the most brutal and hated agents of despotism" in Russia at the International Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam in 1907; she may have raised money in support of Mexican guerrilla resistance, along with funds for their legal defense; she likely knew about, if she did not participate in, Berkman's conspiracy with "militants who imported the tactics of terror" to assassinate John Rockefeller, a planned attentat which ended when three anarchists blew themselves up in the 1914 Lexington Avenue bombing.78 Anarchist historian Paul Avrich supported this line of interpretation, commenting to Barry Pateman that Goldman "never met a bomber she didn't like."79 Like the editors at the Goldman archive, Avrich was concerned that the full force of Goldman's anarchism would be defanged by the popular image of Goldman as free spirited crusader for a revolution in which we could all dance.

Falk points out that Goldman's autobiography should be read as performance, a story selectively told: "Encoded allusions and unnamed accomplices in sub-rosa political activities left hints with no answers, impressions easily erased by time; yet the emotional intimacy of the narrative style and content of her autobiography seduced most readers into believing that Goldman told all and hid nothing."80 Foucault's gloss on parrhesia contrasts its straightforwardness with rhetoric's calculations: "the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy."81 Yet of course earnestness and self-revelation require effective use of grammatical and rhetorical devices; as Don Herzog notes, Goldman was "an accomplished prose stylist" who knew how to move her audiences.82
Her version of parrhesia is complicated, although certainly not negated, by her careful calculations of how much truth to tell, under what circumstances, to what end: for example, she often danced around the censors by advocating birth control in the pages of Mother Earth without actually explaining how conception could be prevented. Goldman’s was a tactically informed parrhesia, carefully calibrated to challenge the authorities effectively while avoiding jailors and censors when possible.

Based on the enormous and rich array of primary resources collected by the Emma Goldman Papers Project, Falk, Pateman, and Moran “challenge previous interpretations, displaying the shadowy edges of a new montage of light and dark that suggest she may have harbored more violent sentiments during the first decade of the twentieth century that many historians previously assumed.”83 Rather than a forerunner of contemporary feminism or an individual nonconformist, the archive’s documentary histories place Goldman within the historical context of the international anarchist movement. While they note that the evidence for Goldman’s participation in violent acts is uncertain, her proximity is suggestive. “Whither she herself was engaged directly in acts of retaliatory violence or simply played a supporting role to a covert movement,” they conclude, Goldman was never far from “those who believed that only with the destruction of the old was the construction of a new order possible.”84

Both of these accounts have merit. Goldman’s compelling political vision, extraordinary powers of communication, and effective coalition-building with more respectable, middle class, non-immigrant critics of American politics did indeed make her ideas dangerous to a status quo contained firmly by the interests of the dominant classes. Goldman consistently pushed against the boundaries of what Foucault calls “the parrhesiastic contract,” the implicit arrangements by which sovereigns accept criticism and agree to hear unwelcome truths.85 While some anarchists belittled free speech struggles as insufficiently radical, Goldman saw them as effective opportunities to expand the purview of unpunishable communication, including speech needed to organize workplaces, spread birth control information, and oppose war. Given that there were no more than a handful of instances of armed resistance by anarchists in the U.S. (compared to a considerable number of high profile attentats in Europe and a virtual free-for-all in Russia), the authorities’ professed fear of violent subversion was clearly exaggerated; yet they were not wrong to see Goldman’s ideas and passions as a threat to their stability and legitimacy.

At the same time, accounts of Goldman’s politics that make her into a pacifist, or that separate her completely from anarchism’s armed adherents,
overlook her enduring connections with insurgents. Interpreting the claims to danger Goldman may have posed to established authority requires attention to the larger context of political violence as well as to the meaning that has subsequently been made of Goldman’s political effects. As Bonnie Honig points out, the actual severity of material threat posed by subversives does not determine the regime’s or the public’s response; rather, we need to know what the threats came to mean for authoritative interpreters. We need to know “how they were lived.”

Heroes from hell. Goldman’s own participation in the attempted attentat against Frick occurred during the “Decade of Regicide,” the final 10 years of the 19th century when “alleged anarchist incidents led to 60 killings and the wounding of some 200 people.” This period was an intense node of violence within the larger time period Davis characterizes as the half century of classical terrorism. While the full historical story of those women and men whom Goldman called “heroes from hell” and Davis characterizes as “avenging angels who stalked kings and robber barons with bomb or dagger in hand” has not been told, the most widely recognized attentats included the murder or attempted murder of the kings of Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium, the emperor of Germany, the Tsar of Russia, the presidents of France, Austria, and the United States, the prime minister of Spain, the Empress of Austria, the French Chamber of Deputies, two American corporate leaders, a Spanish cardinal, a variety of Russian generals and officers, and some unfortunate passersby on Wall Street.

A few patterns stand out in this alarming list and the broader context within which this violence transpired. First, despite official claims that anarchist violence menaced “all persons,” attentats were usually tightly targeted at class and state enemies. The classical terrorists were not, with a few notable exceptions, indiscriminate, and were usually not attempting to terrify a public or a people, although some were attacking representatives of a class. Second, attentats frequently came in clusters, a cycle of state or capitalist atrocities and anarchist retribution. Third, most anarchist violence took place in Russia, while a smaller series of attentats bedeviled authorities in Europe; only a handful occurred in the U.S. Fourth, attentaters were “pariahs of the left,” their deed eschewed by most anarchists and nearly all other radicals, not to mention the broader working class who were “repeatedly victimized for the ‘heroic’ deeds of a few.” Goldman was one of a relatively small number of anarchists who publicly defended Leon Czolgosz’s motives, if not his action, in assassinating President McKinley. Most radicals tried to avoid the devastating backlash against anarchism that Czolgosz’s attentat provoked. There was ample understanding on the left that anarchist assassinations provided the pretext to
repress even moderate social critics, such as Bismark’s moves against the “utterly innocent German social democrats” after the 1881 attempt on the Kaiser’s life. Beyond self-defense, many radicals objected strenuously to the attenaters’ efforts to substitute “the messianic role of the self-sacrificial individual—or the magical totemism of the attenat—for the conscious movement of the masses.” Terror on the left may actively discourage the development of that critical consciousness, as Alexander Berkman found to his dismay when the very workers for whom he attempted to assassinate Frick condemned his act.

Acts of classical terrorism were committed during times in which severe economic crises provoked massive unrest, and struggles between labor and capital over what Alan Trachtenberg calls “the meaning of America” had not yet been settled in favor of owners. Goldman weighed in on the side of the masses, combining covert support for armed insurgents with extensive public efforts to educate and persuade. She was both a radical thinker who challenged power at the level of ideas, beliefs, and passions, and a participant in an international anarchist movement that selectively accepted the necessity of violence. Her political thinking and acting operated as both a real challenge to the legitimacy of state and corporate authorities and a convenient distraction invoked to direct attention away from the ruthless repression of striking workers by those authorities. Constructions of Goldman as a dangerous individual are not the opposite of the “real” Goldman, but are rather elements that help to create the Goldman effect, to constitute the prevailing meaning of Emma Goldman in discourse. We might push our investigation of Goldman’s politics into the challenging area of 1st amendment legal debate, asking when words become deeds; we might even ask whether and when violence is acceptable in political struggle. Yet those are not my questions here, not because they are unimportant but because they distract us from investigating the discursive deployments of security and danger identifying Goldman, but not the agents of capital and the state, as dangerous. Before we can draw conclusions about Goldman’s status as a dangerous individual, we need to ask why this question recurs.

Why Are We Asking This Question?

In violent times, the juridical, medical, and journalistic apparatuses worked overtime to mark the murders that mattered—the victims of attenats, not of strikebreaking; the anarchists’ bombs, not the Pinkertons’ guns; the wealthy at their leisure but not the poor in their distress. The deployments of discourse-producing institutions precede and make possible the meanings discernable
within them. Interconnecting discursive practices within law, medicine, and media made it possible to claim that Goldman was dangerous—or to deny that she was dangerous—while resisting alternative inscriptions of danger. The discourses of danger surrounding Goldman and anarchism enabled a strategic non-seeing, a diminishing of other possible ethical and political engagements with other calculations of threat.

Focus on Goldman’s danger/nondanger in contemporary commentaries may indirectly allow the historic alibi for anti-labor violence to continue operating. Interrogation of Goldman as a dangerous individual both reflects and contributes to the readily available image of “an enemy of society who can equally well be a revolutionary or a murderer.”93 Already historically challenged, U.S. readers can take refuge in soul-searching questions about the actual or potential or imagined danger posed by opponents of state and corporate power, while continuing to forget the overwhelmingly greater menace of federal troops, state militias, law enforcement, private security agencies, and vigilantes toward workers and their families. I am not suggesting that Goldman’s involvement with armed insurgents was insignificant, nor am I discounting the value of the recent historiography complicating her mythic standing in American radical history; rather, I am looking for the questions that might be obscured in these readings, not to provide ready answers but to open up further lines of thinking.

While there were many more acts of “propaganda of the deed” in Europe than in the U.S., America’s half-century of intense violence against labor gave the U.S. “the world’s deadliest industrial history.”94 It is difficult to locate a reliable accounting of the violence against labor during Goldman’s time; while labor historians have provided accounts of the more infamous killings such as Homestead and Ludlow, no one, it seems, has done for murdered workers the meticulous, brutal arithmetic that Ida B. Wells, the Tuskegee Institute, and others have performed to document the lynching of African Americans. Yet it is safe to say that, of all the active sites of political struggle in Goldman’s time, only the terror against blacks and the genocide against Native Americans fell into the same murderous category as state and corporate violence against strikers and their families.95 It was virtually open season on labor, with few penalties for killing workers and their families. Immigrants killed in labor battles were often simply not counted, “not given the dignity of a name or number” or their deaths were reported as heart attacks or suicides.96 Between 1881 and 1905, there were 37,000 wildcat strikes in the U.S., not counting those called by a central union.97 In the turbulent decade of 1890-1900 alone, there were over 16,000 strikes and lockouts involving over 4 million workers.98 Between 1887 and 1903, there were 500 “interventions by state and federal troops on behalf of the owners against the
strikers, with untold numbers of fatalities.\textsuperscript{99} Regular army troops and National Guards of several states, particularly Colorado and Idaho, were sent to put down strikes “at least a dozen times in a dozen years.”\textsuperscript{100} Federal troops and state militias, bolstered by increased resources after the 1877 railroad strike, were mobilized against striking workers with such frequency that labor journalist Joseph R. Buchanan observed that “they were as much a part of the corporations as their accounting departments.”\textsuperscript{101}

Even more resources were available to quell worker activism with private armies, most notably the Pinkertons, who specialized in espionage, provocation, and strike-breaking. In his 1878 book \textit{Strikers, Communists, Tramps, and Detectives}, Alan Pinkerton boasted that his “perfected detective system” could properly discipline the working class: “Hundreds have been punished. Hundreds more will be punished.”\textsuperscript{102} Mr. Pinkerton was correct: thousands of striking workers and their families were killed, and thousands more injured, across the country.\textsuperscript{103} The violence continued through the 1930s, when heads of corporations piously invoked “law and order” while spending millions of dollars per year on industrial spies and armaments to use against strikers.\textsuperscript{104} In the 1930s, the largest private army in the world, numbering 3,500-6,000 men, belonged to Ford Motor Company.\textsuperscript{105} Like blacks and Indians, workers, especially immigrant workers, were bare life, politically unqualified life. They could be killed with impunity, their deaths failing to register as legally sanctioned homicide. Goldman was a pariah for the authorities, eventually included in their political arrangements through the forced exclusion of exile, in part because she kept telling people, in English, all over the country, about the war against labor.

Memory of this bloody ledger has been sidelined in mainstream American histories. The problem isn’t only that the data are neglected (although they are); the bigger problem lies in the selective workings of discursive networks within which events come to count as relevant data in the first place. Goldman tried, and to some degree succeeded, in bringing an analysis of violence against working people to the American public, but she was hampered by a rhetorical cycle of danger that circled back to her own person and reputed activities. Goldman tried to change the subject from her alleged or actual dangerousness to the much greater violence of the state and capital. She had considerable success: her fearless speech reached many thousands of people, stimulating the creation of free speech leagues, free schools, campaigns on behalf of political prisoners, and other concrete legacies of her activism. She not only challenged the authorities directly, but also contested the terms of “the parrhesiastic contract.” Prominent liberals including Roger Baldwin, John Dewey, John Haynes Holmes, and
many others concurred with Don Herzog’s argument that liberals “should be willing to tolerate, and even embrace,” Goldman’s ruthless opposition to capitalism and the state because it provokes moderates to consider perspectives they might not otherwise entertain.106 They agreed with Herzog that Goldman “deserv[ed] a place in the putative liberal democracy that excoriated and deported her.”107

Yet, in fact, she was not in the end accorded that place: Goldman herself tried the tack that Herzog suggests, arguing at her deportation trial that there are different kinds of patriotism and hers, while annoying to authorities, should be accorded a place within the parrhesiastic contract.108 It didn’t work. To understand why simply urging the mainstream to tolerate its fringe was (and often still is) ineffective, we need to move outside such exhortations and focus on the discursive context within which meaning could be made and arguments rendered intelligible. Goldman’s political work was constrained by a negative feedback loop that was difficult to evade: Goldman was scrutinized for signs of danger; she tried to reverse the charges of danger, pointing them back at the establishment; but she had been established to be dangerous, so her accusations of danger were themselves dangerous; her accusations then bounced back to her, becoming more evidence that she herself was the source of peril.

The opposition between violent and peaceful protest was neither the central spindle around which Goldman’s anarchism moved, nor the primary distinction made by the state and corporate institutions that persecuted her and the many thousands of workers killed and injured in labor struggles. People who believed in the ideas of anarchism were, to the authorities, as dangerous as those (few) who planted bombs or assassinated the powerful; anarchists were “potential sources of acts,” provoking alarm for what they might do based on what they were.109 Goldman was dangerous in that she tried to change this calculation, to make the public as aware, and as outraged, by the killing and wounding of workers and their families as by the murder of the wealthy and powerful. She cultivated the discursive resources Americans needed to recalibrate capitalism’s bloody price.

Absent such rethinking, both in her time and in our own, several significant political consequences ensue. First, we decontextualize contemporary violence against trade union activists, making current examples appear to be isolated incidents or far-away acts by third world governments.110 The International Trade Union Confederation’s 2007 report condemns repression of union activists in Columbia, the Philippines, Guinea, Iran, China, Nepal, and many other nations.111 The AFL-CIO charges that in Columbia alone, 1,165 union members have been murdered between 1994-2006.112
Many of these governments train their militaries, paramilitaries, and other security forces largely with U.S. aid, while U.S.-brokered free trade agreements bolster repressive state and corporate policies. When placed within the context of the previous centuries’ violence against labor in the U.S., current repression can be reconceptualized as the global displacement of ongoing economic injustice rather than the isolated actions of backward nations.

Second, the disremembering of America’s violent anti-labor history perhaps ironically shrinks the available political imaginary through which we might create alternative visions of political life. As Alan Trachtenberg noted, during Goldman’s time, the struggle between labor and capital had not yet been decided, and the terms of the relation were widely contested. The “beautiful ideal” toward which Goldman and other radicals struggled sought not merely reform but transformation of society toward justice, freedom, and beauty. If we lose sight of those bloody confrontations, ironing out our national narratives so that state and corporate culpabilities are whitewashed while labor activism loses its radical dimensions, we also diminish our ability to imagine or appreciate the visions and analyses that animated those struggles.

Third, the labor of remembering America’s history of class violence hones our attention to the complex discursive processes by which some historical facts come to count in prevailing narratives, while other facts fade into obscurity. Understanding how they are facts is critical to seeing how power works. The discursive practices by which meanings are created and circulated, as well as interrupted and contested, let us interrogate the process by which the facts that matter are elevated to prominence while contrary evidence is minimized or rewritten. Goldman not only provided neglected information; more importantly, she tried to shift the prevailing networks of discourse so that less familiar accounts could be incorporated into ordinary ways of living. Imagine if she had succeeded: What if the historically literate public were as aware of, say, the massacre of 19 miners in Latimer, Pennsylvania, the anti-labor violence which Leon Czolgosz was avenging, as it is of Czolgosz’s subsequent assassination of McKinley? What if accounts of violence against labor were as central in most U.S. high school history texts as are triumphal details about the American Revolution, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II? What if the modest American Labor Museum in Haledon, New Jersey were instead featured in the Smithsonian complex in Washington, D.C., readily available for tourists to absorb as part of the history everyone is supposed to know? Most Americans are abjectly ignorant of the litany of violence against workers, and perhaps that is the most dangerous circumstance of all.
Notes

5. Ibid, 11.
10. While other discursive sites could be examined for traces of Emma Goldman, including the emergence of modernism in the arts, the evolution of Jewish immigrant communities, the sermons of religious leaders, and the activities of the anarchist movement, the discursive practices of police, reporters, and doctors stand out because they produced so many words about Goldman. Consideration of these other sites for the production of discourse is given in the longer work in progress, Goldman: Political Thinking in the Streets (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
15. This is a paraphrase of Foucault, “Dangerous Individual,” 182.


19. The Austrian foreign minister, in 1898, after the assassination of Empress Elisabeth, quoted in Deflem, "Wild Beasts Without Nationality."

20. "Extradition Order from the French Government," Paris (March 26, 1901) in Falk, Pateman, and Moran, Emma Goldman, vol. 1, 439. Goldman evidently was never served this order, having left France before it was issued.


33. For insightful discussion of later debates over Goldman's alleged dangerousness, especially during her 1934 return to the U.S., see Oz Frankel, "Whatever Happened to 'Red Emma'?" Emma Goldman, from Alien Rebel to American Icon," The Journal of American History 83, no. 3 (December 1996): 903-42.

34. Brothers Lorenzo and Orson Fowler popularized phrenology in the U.S., becoming prominent as the "heads of a phrenological empire based at the Phrenological Institute in New York CI ➔[Madeline B. Stern, "Mark Twain Had His Head Examined," American Literature 41, no. 2 (May 1969): 207-18; quote from p. 207). They published a substantial array of books and self-help manuals linking phrenology with health, fitness, and other progressive movements of the time. The Phrenology Institute boasted its own museum, nicknamed "the Golgotha of Gotham—a veritable House of Skulls" (Stern, "Mark Twain," 207) which served as a site of research and a popular tourist attraction.
37. Ibid, 211.
38. Ibid, 258.
41. Ibid, 214.
42. Ibid, 215.
44. “Character in Unconventional People,” 215.
45. Ibid, 215-16. Stern reports that the editors of the Journal saw their treatment of Goldman as “charitable,” since it was a “violation of professional ethics” to emphasize perceived faults of the subjects in published readings (Heads and Headlines, 233).
47. Ibid, 192.
49. Ibid, 6.
50. This essay considers only her relation to acts of individual political rebellion rather than to the larger question of collective violence or social revolution. While of course the two are related, it is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the latter except as background for Goldman’s political goals and for the fears of social change expressed by her enemies.
51. One might speculate that Goldman and other anarchists benefited from their ominous image, since being thought dangerous might be an advantage to those battling the status quo. However, the concrete consequences for Goldman—lectures prohibited, publications seized, meetings broken up, numerous arrests and imprisonments—interfered with her work considerably, perhaps outweighing possible benefits such as attracting more media attention, inspiring workers to revolt, or intimidating authorities.
53. Ibid, 227.
55. Ibid, 236.
56. Goldman’s correspondence in the 1920s reveals that anarchist editor Claus Timmerman knew about the plot against Frick, and Modest Stein, Berkman’s cousin, had planned to finish Frick after Berkman failed to kill him (Falk, “Introduction,” in Falk, Pateman, and Moran, Emma Goldman, vol. 2, 6, fn. 7).
63. The day after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001, this essay was posted on the web.

64. Anarchism and Other Essays (New York: Dover, 1969), 80.

65. Ibid, 83.

66. Ibid, 92, 93.


68. “Address to the Jury,” 364.


70. Ibid, 270.

71. Ibid, 274.

72. While Goldman did not always travel to prominent sites of labor struggles, she addressed the silk workers in Patterson, New Jersey; United Mine Workers in Springfield, Illinois; American Labor Union in Newark, New Jersey; Glass Blowers’ Union in Monaca, Pennsylvania; Brewers’ and Malters’ Union, Painters and Decorators Union, and Scandinavian Painters Union in Chicago; United Labor League in Philadelphia; Working Women’s Society of the United Hebrew Trade Organization in New York; the anarchist branches of the Central Labor Unions, especially those in Boston and Detroit; International Working Men’s Association (IWMA) and Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) around the country. See “Chronology” in Falk, Pateman, and Moran, Emma Goldman, vol. 1, 489-515, and vol. 2, 469-506.


78. See Falk, “Introduction,” in Falk, Pateman, and Moran, Emma Goldman, vol. 2, 59, 28-29. A fourth individual who was not one of the anarchist plotters was also killed in the blast.

79. This anecdote was shared with me by Barry Pateman.


84. Ibid, 79, 4.

85. Foucault, Fearless Speech, 33.


88. Davis, “Mike Davis Talks,” 228, passim. The interview with Mike Davis quoted here is part of his work in progress, “a world history of revolutionary terrorism from 1878 to 1932,” 227.
89. Ibid, 228, 235.
90. Ibid, 227.
91. Ibid, 235.
95. It is arguable that, by limiting access to birth control information and technologies to several generations of women, authorities contributed to many thousands of women’s deaths in childbirth, botched illegal abortions, and the slow legal murder brought on by starvation and malnutrition. See Linda Gordon, *The Moral Property of Women* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 150, passim.
97. Ibid, 19.
101. Ibid, 68.
103. To my knowledge, there is no central, authoritative source for information on murdered or injured workers. Available sources include: Boyer and Morais, *Labor’s Untold Story; History Matters, American Social History Project/Center for Media and Learning* (Graduate Center, CUNY) and the Center for History and New Media (George Mason University) http://www.historymatters.gmu.edu/ (accessed March 1, 2008); Michael Novak, *The Guns of Latimer* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Howard Zinn, Dana Frank, and Robin Kelley, *Three Strikes* (Boston: Beacon, 2001). Several further qualifications about the context of violence against labor are relevant. First, highlighting this violence throws into shadow the parallel terror against blacks (most of whom were, of course, also laborers, but were specifically targeted because of their color) in Reconstruction. Jim Crow, and lynching. Second, there was episodic violence by strikers against strike breakers, often blacks, Asians, and the most recent immigrants, who of course were also workers. Third, the larger structural violence against labor included the semi-starvation of workers during strikes and lock outs, their removal from their homes, their deportation, their deaths and injuries from unsafe industrial and mining conditions, and their overall poverty and suffering. Without denying these other violence, my point here is to call attention to the enormous number of instances of direct violence against workers to highlight critical events in the submerged history of labor.
107. Ibid, 326.


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